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I
INTRODUCTION

The warranty is a pervasive element of both commercial and consumer
sales contracts;' besides price and quantity terms, it is often the most
important item in contract negotiation. For example, competition for sales in
the automobile industry through warranty terms is particularly striking, 2 and
3
in some industrial markets, warranty cost is a major expense for firms.
Because of the economic significance of warranties, economists have
elaborated a substantial body of literature explaining their role in
transactions. 4 The understanding of the legal attributes of warranties
manifest in these analyses is rather coarse, combining the notion of a warranty
as a promise about product characteristics with the notion of a warranty as a
remedy for breach of the promise. While this imprecision does not subvert
the logic of the authors' arguments, it may have diverted their attention from
some interesting issues associated with warranty use.
This article attempts to suggest valuable refinements and extensions of the
economic theory of warranty by explicitly considering the choice of remedies
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1. The economics literature on warranties has primarily addressed consumer warranties. See
infra articles cited in note 4 and in Part III. But warranties are common in commercial transactions as
well as consumer transactions. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 200-06 (1982).
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See Cooper & Ross, Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard, 16 RAND J. ECON. 103 (1985);

LACKO, PRODUCT QUALITY

AND INFORMATION

IN THE USED

CAR MARKET (1987)

(Bureau of

Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission).
3. One survey of 369 industrial product warranties found that 40% of the firms sampled had
warranty costs that were 2% or more of their total revenues. See E. McGUIRE, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT
WARRANTIES (1980). For products described as scientific equipment and controls, 24% of the
sampled firms had warranty costs that were 5% or more of total revenues. See id. A survey of the
used car market found that warranties add 10% to the price of a car. SeeJ. LACKO, supra note 2, at 64.
4. See infra Part III for a discussion of this literature. Warranties are viewed as a risk-sharing
device in Heal, Guarantees and Risk Sharing, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 549 (1977). Articles modeling
warranties as devices for quality disclosure include: Courville & Hausman, Warranty Scope and
Reliability under Imperfect Information and Alternative Market Structures, 92 J. Bus. 361 (1979); Grossman,
The Information Role of Warrantiesand Private Disclosureabout Product Quality, 24 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1981);
Spence, Consumer Misperception, Product Failure and Product Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).
Warranties as a means of quality control are discussed in Cooper & Ross, supra note 2.
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for breach of warranty in conjunction with the choice of warranty protection
itself. In particular, it offers explanations for the prevalence of replacement
terms rather than refund terms in warranties. Economists studying the
general issue of breach of contract have noted that the choice of remedy has
important implications for risk sharing, renegotiation, transaction-specific
investment, and the incentive to breach. 5 This article derives much of its
insight from the recognition that work on the economics of contract breach
has much to say that is relevant to the economics of warranties.
Part II of the article describes the remedies explicitly provided for breach
of warranty in commercial and consumer contracts, as well as the remedies
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") that may be applicable
when the contract is silent on the issue. This section probes beyond the
formal statement of remedies to explore the law and economics of warranty
disputes. Even though settlement negotiations may lead to the selection of a
remedy not listed in the contract or called for by law, the contract remedies
and UCC do affect the outcome of negotiation.
The third part of the article reviews economic theories concerning the
purpose of warranties. It argues that these theories offer an incomplete
understanding of warranties since they fail to explain adequately the selection
of remedy terms in warranties. Parts IV.A through IV.C develop new
economic theories explaining the purpose of warranties and the observed
pattern of remedy selection in warranty policies.
II
WARRANTY LAW AND RELATED

Topics

IN CONTRACT LAW

We begin this section by describing warranty terms that commonly are
included in contracts. The parties to many contracts, however, fail to specify
their preferences for remedies for breach of warranty, as well as other
warranty terms. Presumably, the parties in such cases intend to rely on the
default terms provided by contract law. Thus, the warranty terms offered by
the UCC to govern sales contracts are also recounted.
Most of the survey work on warranties has been impressionistic rather than
systematic. 6 Scholars studying the warranty terms in observed contracts,
however, are in consensus regarding certain features of warranties.
Examination of contracts reveals that in both consumer and commercial
agreements the warranty clauses almost always call for repair or replacement
of defective parts or products. 7 Furthermore, consumer contracts generally
5. See generally READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (V. Goldberg ed. 1989).
6. See, e.g., Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Schwartz &
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Marketsfor Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests,
69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
7. A careful survey of service managers at firms manufacturing industrial products revealed
that 87.2% of warranties provided for replacement of defective parts and 70.8% covered the expense
of repair. D. Berry, Warranty and Service Costs Study 4 (1985) (unpublished manuscript). See also H.
GREENBERG, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER U.C.C. ARTICLE 2, at 319 (1987); Priest, supra note 6, at

1319-27; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 6, at 1416. These studies are incomplete in that they only
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exclude consequential damages. 8 Money-refund warranties are normally
found only in two contexts, either coupled with satisfaction guarantees, or
offered by retailers. 9
On first thought the prevalence of repair-or-replacement warranties is
surprising to economists because consumers should prefer money-refund
warranties. Refunds are a type of cash transfer from the seller to the buyer,
while repair and replacement constitute in-kind transfers. Economists are
quick to argue that cash transfers are more efficient than in-kind transfers.' 0
For example, with regard to welfare benefits, a cash payment is more efficient
than food stamp benefits because it gives the recipient greater freedom of
choice. Cash can be used to purchase anything; food stamps can only be
exchanged for food.
Likewise, a consumer experiencing breach of warranty could take a money
refund and repurchase the original product if he so desired, achieving the
same result as repair-or-replacement remedies. Furthermore, the consumer
would have the freedom to switch to some other product. In a competitive
market, firms must offer efficient contract terms to survive. Even in a
monopoly market the seller would offer the efficient warranty to consumers to
maximize the value of the transaction. It then extracts greater profit through
higher prices than would be possible given an inefficient warranty.
Regardless of market structure, if the cost of the different remedies is the
same to the seller, then the seller has an incentive to provide the type of
warranty desired by the consumer. Thus, money-refund warranties should
predominate. To counter this argument one can claim either that the cost of
repair-or-replacement warranties is lower than the cost of a money refund, or
that there are subtle advantages to either buyers or sellers from these
remedies that offset the obvious advantage of the money-refund warranty.
This article does not consider the relative costs of the different warranty
remedies. Rather, it explains the prevalence of repair and replacement terms
by arguing that they are superior to refund. Part III considers the advantage
of a repair remedy as compared to a refund. Parts IV.A through IV.C suggest
advantages of replacement warranties.
Beyond explaining the prevalence of repair-or-replacement warranties,
this article addresses the normative question of the appropriate content of
analyze standard warranty policies. If a warranty is granted implicitly, then the remedy most
probably will be damages. Also, since express oral warranties are usually not accompanied with a
specification of remedies, the probable remedy for breach of such warranties will again be damages.
We have no data on how common or significant these practices are.
8. See Priest, supra note 6, at 1301-02. The effect of such exclusion, however, is questionable
since many courts bar limitations on consequential damages in consumer contracts. See D. WHALEY,
WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 118 (1981).
9. This judgment is based on the surveys cited in note 7 (showing that refunds are uncommon
in manufacturers' contracts for either consumer or industrial goods) and the authors' informal survey
of consumer warranty policies.
10. See, e.g., H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 164-65 (1988) (in-kind food transfers to the poor are less
efficient than cash transfers).
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contract law concerning warranties.' I The normative criterion invoked by
economists is efficiency. Contract law can affect the efficiency of sales
agreements directly by proscribing or commanding certain contract terms,
and indirectly by providing a backdrop against which contract negotiations
proceed. If the negotiators fail to provide for a contingency in their contract,
then contract law fills the gap. Specifically, if the contract is silent on whether
repair, replacement, or refund is an appropriate remedy for breach of
warranty, contract law should impose the optimal remedy.
Before delving into the discussion of the questions outlined above, it is
worthwhile to develop a brief primer of warranty law. 12 A warranty is a
representation by the seller of a characteristic of the product offered for sale.
The representation is factual rather than mere puffing, and generally pertains
to either a matter of reliability or suitability of a product. The representation
may be either express or implied; in the latter case reliability is promised in
the implied warranty of merchantability, and suitability is promised in the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Implied warranties may
be waived and a product sold as is. Often a warranty is a promise that a
machine will operate as intended, but a warranty may also be a promise that a
product has a certain composition-for example, that the fat content of meat
is below some level.1 3 In addition, a warranty might promise that a durable
product, such as house paint, will last for a certain number of years.
A warranty then is a promise, and if that promise is breached, some
remedy must be forthcoming. The remedy may be provided for explicitly in a
contract, calling for the repair or replacement of the product in question, or
for the refund of some portion of the sales price to the buyer. Additionally,
4
the warranty clause may limit or exclude certain types of damage claims.'
Finally, a schedule of liquidated damages may be specified.
Often the remedy for breach of an express warranty is not specified in the
sales contract, and of course, the remedy for breach of an implied warranty is
not specified by the parties. In a contract covered by the UCC, 15 sections 2601 through 2-609, supply contractual terms applicable when nonconforming goods are delivered and the contract is silent on the matter. The
UCC's approach codifies the common law doctrine known as the "perfect
tender" rule. The buyer may reject delivery "if the goods . . . fail in any
11. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the efficiency of expectation damages and replacement
remedies.
12. The material contained in this and the following paragraph can be found in H. GREENBERG,
supra note 7.
13. SeeJ.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., Inc., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976).
14. Many warranty policies exclude consequential damages. See D. WHALEY, supra note 8, at 115.
Contract clauses exonerating the seller for consequential damages resulting from physical injuries to
the buyer are not allowed. Id. at 111. In addition to recovery under contract theory, product liability
law offers compensation in the event of physical injury. This article will not address issues involving
physical injury.
15. Article 2 of the UCC is very broad, governing all "transactions in goods." UCC § 2-102
(1977). It has been adopted by every state except Louisiana, as well as the District of Columbia, the
Virgin Islands, and Guam. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, I U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1989) (table of
jurisdictions in which Code has been adopted).
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If a buyer accepts delivery and
respect to conform to the contract .
later discovers the non-conformity, he or she may revoke acceptance if there is
a substantial impairment of value to the buyer.' 7 The buyer may also accept
8
the goods and seek damages.'

The right of the buyer to reject delivery is coupled with the right of the
seller to cure a non-conformity after rejection, meaning that the seller may
repair or replace the non-conforming goods.' 9 However, the right to cure
does not follow revocation, the Code is silent on this matter, and the
"majority rule is that the seller has no statutory right to cure .... "20 Thus,
the UCC provides for repair, replacement, or damages at the option of the
seller in the case of rejection, and after revocation the buyer may permit
repair or replacement, but can demand damages if desired.
If the buyer either rejects delivery or justifiably revokes acceptance of nonconforming goods, then damages under the UCC usually include a refund of
the purchase price, the cost of "cover," and consequential and incidental
damages. 2 If the buyer has accepted the goods and the time to revoke such
acceptance has passed, then damages may be calculated "in any manner which
is reasonable." 22 Under the UCC, damage awards to compensate for breach
of warranty are usually measured by the difference in the value of the goods as
warranted and the value of the goods received.2 3 In addition, a court may
24
award incidental and consequential damages.
Two final comments on the law of remedies for breach of warranty are
relevant to the following analysis. First, specific performance is generally not
available to force replacement or repair of a non-conforming good. 25 As a
result, a seller cannot make a credible commitment to provide repair or
replacement. There may be situations following breach of warranty in which
the seller would rather not provide repair or replacement, and therefore
breaches this duty knowing that damages will be payable, or an out of court
settlement will be reached. Furthermore, in the absence of specific
performance, buyers cannot be given a meaningful election of remedy
options, since the seller can always ignore the buyer's demand for repair or
replacement and pay damages.
16.

U.C.C. § 2-601 (1977).

17.

Id. § 2-608.

See D. WHALEY, supra note 8, at 163.
19. U.C.C. § 2-508 (1977).
20. H. GREENBERG, supra note 7.
21. U.C.C. § 2-711 (1977). Consequential damages are losses that would not have occurred in
the absence of breach, and include personal injury costs, lost resale profits, lost good will, lost time
on other projects, and many other types of losses. Incidental damages are costs that are incurred by
the buyer in detecting and attempting to avoid breach. The significance of the distinction is that
incidental damages are always recoverable, whereas consequential damages are only recoverable to
the extent that they are foreseeable. See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 358-61.
22. U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (1977).
23. Id.§ 2-714(2).
24. Id. § 2-714(3).
18.

25.

See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 341.
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The other relevant area of remedy law is liquidated damages, which
operates to take the decision concerning the amount of damages out of the
hands of the court, making it a subject negotiated by the parties to a contract.
Sufficiently high liquidated damages have the same effect as specific
performance. A contract can make the commitment to provide repair or
replacement credible by including a substantial disincentive for the seller to
fail to honor the repair-or-replace remedy. The value of this policy is severely
restricted, however, because liquidated damages are only enforceable if other
remedies are inconvenient, the amount of loss is difficult to prove, and the
26
amount of award is reasonable either ex ante or ex post.
Given the state of the law, two remedy configurations are feasible: first,
repair, replacement, or refund at the option of the seller; and second, an
exclusive damage remedy. 2 7 To understand the validity of this claim, an
exhaustive set of possible remedies must be considered. An implied warranty
or an express warranty with no remedy provision requires reference to the
common law or a state's incarnation of the UCC for the applicable remedy.
As noted above, the UCC provides that after rejection of non-conforming
goods the seller has the option to cure the non-conformity. 28 In other words,
the Code provides the seller with the choice of repair, replacement, or
damages.
Next, consider the cases arising when remedies are explicitly specified in
the contract. If a contract calls for refund, then the parties could bargain for
repair or replacement instead, but neither party could insist upon it.29 An
explicit repair-or-replace provision can be ignored by the seller, effectively
giving the seller the option to choose money damages or to attempt to make
an out of court settlement payment. In contrast, a contract giving the seller
the choice of all three remedies achieves its intended effect. Finally, if a
contract gives the buyer the option to choose the remedy type, the effect is the
same as agreeing to an exclusive money-refund remedy, since either party
could refuse repair or replacement.
Although the law does not make credible either an exclusive repair-orreplace remedy or an agreement to give the buyer the remedy choice,

26. Id. at 252-53.
27. It should be emphasized that consequential damages may be recoverable after replacement
has occurred, creating a coupling of replacement and damage payments other than refund of the
purchase price. See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 357. Additionally, contracts can limit
consequential damages by exclusion or by liquidated damages provisions. See id. at 248-49, 252.
28. Attention is placed on rejection rather than revocation of acceptance because revocation is
possible only when the value to the buyer is substantially impaired and either discovery of nonconformity was difficult at the time of acceptance or the buyer reasonably assumed the nonconformity would be cured. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1977). The requirements for revocation are more
stringent than for rejection, and the buyer is in a stronger legal position following rejection should
the dispute go to trial. See D. WHALEY, supra note 8, at 176-77. The only practicable remedy after
revocation is damages. See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 319.
29. The same situation prevails under the UCC after revocation of acceptance. See H.
GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 341.
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economic forces may accomplish this end. 30 Note that the seller incurs
various costs by ignoring the contractual remedies. Settlement and potential
litigation costs are obvious costs that can be avoided by honoring a
replacement promise. The seller also avoids the uncertainty of litigation and
settlement negotiations. Furthermore, the seller suffers loss of reputation by
breaching the warranty. In addition, the seller might hesitate to contravene
the remedy terms in the warranty out of fear of liability for consequential
damages. When consequential damages have been excluded by the contract,
the seller might become liable for them because refusal to honor the repair3
or-replacement agreement may void the exclusion. '
Two of these economic factors impact more substantially in consumer
goods markets than in commercial transactions.3 2 In consumer markets a
reputation for fair customer complaint management is an important
determinant of brand loyalty. 33 In contrast, buyers in the commercial sector

are likely to be better informed about suppliers, diminishing the role of
reputation. Furthermore, possible exposure to consequential damages is a
more potent deterrent to refusal to repair or replace in consumer markets
because of the widespread use of limitations on consequential damages in
consumer contracts.
Before proceeding to an economic analysis of remedies for breach of
warranty, it is time to take stock of the feasible remedy configurations. The
UCC stipulates that the remedy is selected at the seller's option following
rejection of non-conforming goods. The four variations of contractual
remedies are as follows: exclusive repair or replacement, exclusive refund,
seller's option, and buyer's option. Given certain conditions, the possibility of
seller's breach of repair-or-replace clauses reduces the possible choices to
either exclusive refund or seller's option.
This taxonomy is helpful in interpreting warranty terms in contracts
observed in the economy. The refund remedy is rarely observed in
30. The absence of any sources noting that firms frequently refuse to honor the replacement
provisions of warranty agreements provides strong evidence that in the consumer context, some
force works to ensure that firms provide replacements instead of paying damages.
31. See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 246-50. If repair or replacement is the exclusive contract
remedy and the seller will not perform, then under the UCC the remedy fails its essential purpose,
and the buyer may turn to other remedies provided by the UCC. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977). See
Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1728 (Callaghan) (Ky. Ct. App. 1985);
Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 840 (Callaghan) (I11. Ct. App. 1982). See
generally Kanovitz, Warranties with Exclusive Repair-and-Replace Remedies: When Does the Buyer's Cause of
Action Accrue?, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431. Courts are divided on whether the consequential damages
provision is severable. See H. GREENBERG, supra note 7, at 249. This potential cost of refusing to
replace is less important in jurisdictions in which exclusion of consequential damages in consumer
contracts is disallowed.
32. For products such as small appliances that are covered by both the manufacturer's repair-orreplace warranty and the retailer's money-refund warranty, the buyer is given an option of remedy
choice.
33. See C. Fornell & B. Wernerfelt, A Model for Customer Complaint Management: A
Segmentation Approach II (Aug. 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that the "introduction of
complaint management could increase market share [in the eye glass industry] by about 10
percentage points").
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combination with a warranty of merchantability. 34 The repair-or-replace
remedy that accompanies such warranties is likely to be credible in consumer
goods markets, but may be better viewed as creating an option for the seller
to choose either repair, replacement, or refund in commercial transactions.
In commercial contracts governed by the UCC that are silent on the remedy,
the seller also has the option of remedy choices. Given the economic
presumption in favor of the refund remedy, we turn now to the existing
economic explanations of warranties to look for some insight into the
35
question of remedy choice.
III
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF WARRANTY

Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the existence of warranties is
that they provide insurance against product failure or dissatisfaction to riskaverse consumers. 36 The insurance is usually bundled with the product rather
than sold separately by an insurance company for several reasons.3 7 The
manufacturer may find it easier to detect product misuse by a consumer than a
third party would, alleviating consumer moral hazard. 38 Manufacturers might
bundle the insurance and the product in order to achieve price
discrimination,3 9 or the transaction costs of seeking out a separate insurer
might be so large as to make third-party insurance infeasible.
The insurance theory offers little hope of explaining the preference for
repair-or-replace warranties. Usually, repair-or-replace warranties and refund
warranties provide equally effective insurance, although both have their faults.
One difficulty with the repair-or-replace remedy occurs when the vendor is
incapable of providing a satisfactory product. 40 This might happen in the case
34. This judgment is based on the authors' informal survey of warranty terms in contracts. See
also infra note 52 (discussing the "party dress" moral hazard problem that results from the combining
of these two warranty provisions).
35. Refund provisions accompanying satisfaction guarantees are credible. There is no economic
mystery surrounding the choice of the refund remedy for this type of transaction. That is, if a
product is unsuitable because it does not satisfy a particular consumer's needs or tastes, then a
repair-or-replacement remedy is of no value. This type of warranty is excluded from the subsequent
discussion.
36. The question of whether firms are risk-averse or risk-neutral is disputed, so this discussion
will focus on consumers.
37. Insurance against product failure is not always bundled with the product. Sellers as well as
third parties commonly offer separate service contracts, especially when selling cars and appliances.
38. "Moral hazard arises when an agent can influence the occurrence of an event (here product
failure) against which the agent is insured, but the seller of the insurance policy cannot monitor or
detect this action. In the case of warranty, the terms of the warranty may create an incentive for the
buyer to give his [product] insufficient maintenance .
or use it carelessly. L. PHILIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 58 (1988).

39. See Braverman, Gausch & Salop, Defects in Disneyland: Quality Control as a Two-Part Tariff, 50
REV. ECON. STUD. 121 (1983); Kubo, Quality Uncertainty and Guarantee, 30 EUR. EcoN. REV. 1063
(1986).
40. A problem may also arise when the buyer seeks to insure against the risk that the product
will not be suitable for his or her purpose. For certain products known as "experience goods," the
buyer can judge suitability only after use. Thus, a consumer may discover after purchase that he or
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of a new product or new design that is inherently unmerchantable, so that a
41
working product cannot be produced at reasonable cost.

With a money refund, the buyer can purchase another unit of the product
and be in the same position as he would have been following repair or
replacement. However, the refund fails to provide the same insurance as the
repair-or-replace remedy if a repurchaser faces a higher price than the
original purchase price. The higher price could result either from price
discrimination against the repurchaser or from a general price increase for the
product. 4 2 Price discrimination is simply the practice of charging different
prices to different types of customers. It is not likely to succeed in mass
markets for consumer goods because of the difficulty in identifying particular
consumers as repurchasers. Price discrimination in commercial markets is
more plausible. 43 The problem created by a general price increase could be
avoided by making the refund equal to the larger of either the current market
44
value or the original sales price.

The insurance theory of warranties may be valid, but it is incomplete, since
it fails to explain the paucity of refund remedies. The theory is also limited by
the fact that consumer warranties are incomplete in their coverage and limited
in duration compared to product life, thereby providing incomplete
insurance. These failings lead economists to search for additional or
alternative explanations for warranties.
A second candidate is the comparative advantage theory, which contends
that warranties optimally assign the responsibility for quality control,
maintenance, and repair to buyers and sellers. Priest 4 5 suggests the example
of refrigerators in which warranties cover the motor, but not the door.
Presumably, the motor fails because of problems at the factory rather than
anything the consumer does. On the other hand, consumer misuse could
damage the door, and lack of warranty coverage for that item would
encourage the consumer to take care.
This theory is useful in explaining the predilection toward repair instead
of refund remedies. A seller may have a comparative advantage in repair of a
product as compared to a repairperson hired by the buyer, because of a
cheaper inventory of repair parts, greater knowledge of the technology, or
she cannot be well matched with any of a seller's products. A repair-or-replacement warranty fails to
provide valuable insurance in this case.
41. In such a case, the courts interpreting the UCC probably would find that the remedy clause
fails its essential purpose and would award money damages. See supra note 28.
42. Discrimination in a mass consumer market is also difficult because of the ease of arbitrage
through resale. Furthermore, the would-be victim of discrimination could find an agent who does
not fall into the disfavored category to make the purchase.
43. Discussion of this topic is deferred to Part IV.A. Although price discrimination may be
possible in commercial markets, commercial buyers may not have a sufficient interest in the
insurance properties of a warranty. Economists often argue that firms should act as if they are riskneutral. Even if they are not, there is no reason to believe that the buyer is more risk-averse than the
seller and will seek insurance through a warranty agreement.
44. This tactic may create a consumer moral hazard problem whereby the consumer deliberately
breaks the product to capture the value of the price increase.
45. Priest, supra note 6, at 1309.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 52: No. I

information gained by the manufacturer's product designers and engineers
from repair experience. In this case a payment covering the cost of repair is
inefficient compared to repair as a remedy. However, if repair is not feasible,
then replacement and refund warranties should be equally effective in
maintaining the appropriate level of quality control by the seller, while care is
induced from the buyer by the limitations of the warranty.
While the comparative advantage theory explains the prevalence of repair
warranties, it does not explain the preference for replacement warranties over
refund warranties. To analyze this issue, consider a third theory for the
existence of warranties, which emphasizes the potential asymmetry of product
quality information between the buyer and the seller. Imagine a market in
which product quality (measured by failure rate) varies across firms. High
quality goods are sold by some firms, while others sell low quality goods.
Whether a firm has a high or low quality product is exogenously determined.
Consumers can only determine product quality through use. 4 6 At the time of

purchase the products are indistinguishable.
The ability of low quality firms to charge the same price as high quality
firms for an inferior product works to the disadvantage of consumers and high
quality firms. To distinguish themselves, high quality firms offer longer
warranties. The longer warranty is a signal to consumers regarding the high
47
quality of a seller's product.
The low quality firms would be tempted to match the warranty policy of
high quality firms to convince consumers that they too are high quality, but a
given warranty would be more costly for a low quality firm because of more
frequent failures. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, the low quality
firm will not imitate the high quality firm. High quality firms will be able to
charge a higher price to cover the greater warranty expenses and cost of
making a high quality product.
This theory does not fare well when confronted with data showing that
warranty coverage is quite uniform within industries, even though product
quality is variable. 48 Furthermore, for the theory to establish a distinction
between replacement and refund warranties, it must be true that the warranty
cost difference between high and low quality firms is more pronounced for
one of the remedies. It is not clear why the warranty costs under the two
49
remedies might differ.
46. This proposition assumes that direct inspection by consumers, word of mouth, and reports
from sources such as newspapers or consumer reports are insufficient to fully inform buyers about
quality.
47. For a more sophisticated discussion of the signaling role of warranties, see Grossman, supra
note 4; Spence, supra note 4; K. Chapman, Can Warranties Signal Quality: Constraining Warranty to
be Less than Price (June 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
48. See Priest, supra note 6, at 1319-46; Gavin, Quality on the Line, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1983, at 65.
49. If the buyer receiving the money refund repurchases the original product, then the cost of
refund warranties is the same as the cost of replacement warranties since in both cases, the seller
incurs the cost of providing one more unit. If the buyer leaves the market or purchases the product
from another seller, however, then the difference in the warranty costs of high and low quality firms
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Besides the signaling model, the asymmetry of product quality information
gives rise to a model of warranties based on the moral hazard facing the
seller. 50 In this model, firms are identical and can control quality by exerting
effort. In the absence of warranties an inefficiently low level of quality is
provided. This result follows because consumers cannot determine quality
before purchase, and firms reduce production costs by skimping on quality
control. 5 1 By moving the risk of failure from the buyer to the seller, full
warranty induces the efficient level of quality control by the firm. As in the
comparative advantage model, however, the necessary incentives can be
provided using either replacement or refund as the remedy. 52
The final possible role of warranties described in the economics literature
is as a tool of price discrimination. 5 3 Models in this vein assume that
heterogeneous customers face a monopolist who sets price, quality, and
warranty terms. 54 The warranty is used to sort customers according to their
degree of risk aversion. A schedule of prices, quality levels, and warranty
terms is offered to customers, and discrimination is achieved as they sort
themselves. The high valuation customers choose the most complete
warranty coverage, pay the highest price, and get the highest quality. 5 5 In
these models little attention has been paid to the nature of the remedy, since
the product is provided by a monopolist. Consumers experiencing failure
repurchase the monopolist's product, making refunds equivalent to
replacements .56
is greater for the refund warranty. Specifically, the difference in refund warranty costs between high
and low quality firms is (/L - fj 1 )P, wheref is the probability of product failure, P is the price of the
product, and H and L represent high and low quality. With a replacement warranty, the cost
difference isfLCL - fHCH, where C is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit. Since the

cost of a product is generally less than the price of a product, the cost difference for refund
warranties will generally be greater than the cost difference of replacement warranties. This
difference is further compounded by the fact that C, is usually less than C,,.
50. See Cooper & Ross, supra note 2.
51. Firms' concern for their reputations will alleviate but not eliminate this problem.
52. Buyer moral hazard may shed some light on the different roles for replacement and refund
remedies. There are two circumstances under which a buyer facing a refund remedy has an incentive
to cause product failure. First, there is the "party dress" moral hazard problem whereby a consumer
can get an essentially free rental of an item, such as a party gown, by returning it on the morning
after the social event, claiming it does not fit, and receiving a refund. This danger is eliminated by a
replacement remedy. Second, a buyer may also be tempted to cause product failure and seek a
refund of the original purchase price when the product's price is declining. Once again, a
replacement policy avoids this danger.
53. Price discrimination and warranties are discussed in Matthews & Moore, Monopoly Provision of
Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening, 55 ECONOMETRICA 441
(1987); Braverman, Gausch & Salop, supra note 39.
54. Heterogeneity of customers is not necessary, as shown by Braverman, Gausch & Salop, supra
note 39. These authors present a model in which warranties are used to implement a two-part tariff
that extracts consumer surplus from homogeneous consumers when demand curves are sloping
down.

55. See Matthews & Moore, supra note 53.
56. At the symposium of this issue, Bob Marshall suggested a different type of price
discrimination that relies on the replacement remedy. Consider the case of the new car market. Car
dealers and manufacturers may want buyers experiencing product failure to get a replacement
because they can earn supernormal profits on replacement parts in the post-warranty lifetime of the
car. Evidence that excessive profits are earned on replacement parts for cars is provided by Crandall,
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IV
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF WARRANTIES DISTINGUISHING REPAIR
AND REPLACEMENT REMEDIES

The purpose of the preceding argument was to establish that standard
form contracts containing warranties rely primarily on repair-or-replacement
remedies, though the operation of contract law effectively may make these
warranties enforceable by providing for damages if the seller so chooses.
However, economic incentives, especially in consumer markets, may make the
limitation to repair or replace credible. The review of the economic literature
concerning warranties locates an explanation for a preference for repair over
refund remedies, but provides no indication why replacement might be
preferred to refund. This section will develop new economic theories
explaining the existence of warranties that allow for a different role for
replacement as compared to refund warranties.
A.

Replacement Warranties as a Method of Discriminating Among
Customers

It was mentioned above that economic theorists have shown that warranty
policy may be implemented in such a way as to promote price and quality
discrimination. Three conditions must be satisfied to enable a firm to
discriminate successfully. First, a firm must gain privately held information
Second, it also must implement a
about consumer preferences.
discriminatory marketing plan that blocks arbitrage. Arbitrage consists of
excessive purchases by favored consumers, who then resell to disfavored
consumers. Finally, the would-be discriminator must possess market power,
or else its rivals will serve the disfavored consumers, undermining the
scheme.
The models described in Part III rely on a set of screening contracts to
obtain information and prevent arbitrage, where screening is achieved
through a schedule of offers to sell a good in which various combinations of
quality, price, and warranty coverage are proposed. 5 7 Consumers reveal
information about their private preferences through their choice of a
particular contract. Arbitrage opportunities are absent because all consumers
have access to the same set of offers.
A different method of achieving discrimination can be implemented using
replacement warranties. Suppose that consumers differ in terms of their
ability to use a product, or the suitability of the product for their needs. To
simplify, suppose that there are good and bad consumers, and that good
consumers experience a lower rate of failure with a particular product, or are
more likely to find a product to be highly valuable than bad consumers. In
this environment, a warranty claim can be used to provide information on the
Vertical Integration and the Market for Repair Parts in the U.S. Automobile Industry, 16J. INDUS. ECON. 212
(1968).
57. Often, economists imprecisely refer to each offer as a contract whether it is accepted or not.
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consumer type; a consumer experiencing failure is more likely to be a bad
type. Since the warranty claim provides the information, the distinction
between remedies is not important unless one of them is more effective in
preventing arbitrage. This is where replacement warranties are potentially
superior to refunds.
Consider the case of a monopolist who wishes to discriminate in favor of
bad types by giving them a more reliable (and more costly) product. Such
discrimination might be profitable if it is efficient to provide a higher quality
product to bad consumers than to good consumers. This would be the case if
the increased cost of making the higher quality product was more than offset
by the reduction in the failure rate for the bad type of consumers, but not for
the good type.
An example will be helpful to clarify these assumptions. Suppose that the
high quality product never fails and costs Ch. The low quality product has a
failure rate offg for good consumers andfb for bad consumers, wherefg < fb.
The low quality product costs CI which is less than Ch. Efficiency dictates
providing the low-quality product to the good consumers if C1/(1 - fg) < Ch,
while C1/(I - fh) > Ch implies that providing a high quality product to bad
consumers is efficient.
Such discrimination could be achieved in a limited way by guaranteeing
that after product failure, the replacement provided the consumer is of higher
quality than the original product. 5 8 The consumer receiving the replacement
might be a good type consumer, but the probability that the consumer is a bad
type is higher than in the population at large. A money refund does not
provide this opportunity to discriminate because there is no way for the seller
to distinguish new purchasers from those who have experienced failure. 59
A potential problem that arises when consumers experiencing failure are
treated more favorably than those not making a warranty claim is consumer
moral hazard. If consumer misuse resulting in failure is not verifiable by the
courts, then consumers will break their product to get the higher quality
replacement. Compounding this problem is the fact that litigation is likely to
58. Quality discrimination could also be achieved if the product were leased. The lessor initially
would provide low quality products to all lessees and subsequently would replace them with higher
quality products after product failure.
In the hypothetical cases discussed below, it is reasonable to assume that consumers do not know
their type until after they use the product. Given this assumption, the screening contracts cannot
effectively discriminate among initial purchasers because the consumers are not aware of their type.
59. It is possible, however, to achieve discrimination with a money refund by giving a consumer
making a warranty claim a certificate that entitles the bearer to purchase a higher quality replacement
from the original seller at no additional cost. Two factors make this scheme relatively unattractive.
First, arbitrage would be less costly, since it is easier to sell a certificate to a good type buyer than it is
to resell a high quality product obtained as a replacement. Therefore, the transaction costs of
arbitrage may be lower with a replacement warranty for the consumer wanting to exit the market and
spend the refund money elsewhere. Second and more important, the refund and certificate scheme
would be administratively difficult for manufacturers offering warranties on products sold through
retailers. Each retailer would have to maintain a special inventory of high quality products that
would only be sold to bearers of the certificate, whereas the manufacturer would maintain a single
replacement inventory.
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be quite costly relative to the cost of honoring a false warranty claim for many
consumer products, limiting the seller's ability to alleviate the moral hazard
problem even when misuse is verifiable.
Mindful of this caveat concerning moral hazard, the appeal of this theory is
greatest in application to consumer transactions in which there is little or no
temptation for the consumer to cheat. If the successful operation of a product
for some initial period implies that product failure is unlikely to occur
prematurely, then there is no incentive to switch to the higher quality product.
Furthermore, since discrimination can only occur after failure, a high failure
rate is necessary to create a substantial advantage for replacement warranties.
To illustrate these points, suppose that microwave ovens will either fail in
the first month of use, or else last for ten years, and that the probability of
failure is lower for consumers with modern electric wiring in their homes.
Further, suppose that a more expensive oven can be designed that will not
fail. After the initial month of use, no consumer has an incentive to make a
false claim, because the oven is known to be well made. Consumers who
experience failure during that month receive the higher quality ovens.
Discrimination is achieved by providing consumers experiencing failure
with a higher quality product. Why not offer both the high and low quality
products for sale initially? It is likely that consumers will not know anything
more about their type than the seller, and would not be able to sort
themselves into one class buying the low quality good, and a second class
buying the high quality good. Even if they did know their type, it might not be
possible to find a profit-maximizing set of offers that would induce the bad
type, but not the good type, to choose high quality.
In commercial transactions it is likely that the problem with moral hazard
can be mitigated by threat of litigation, but the difference between refund and
replacement warranties in achieving discrimination is less striking. As an
example consider the case of photocopy machines. Imagine that certain users
have a workplace that is very dusty, causing more frequent breakdown of the
machine. Suppose the warranty policy called for replacement after a certain
amount of down-time for a machine, and that the replacement is higher
quality. This policy achieves discrimination in terms of product quality.
Discrimination could also be achieved with a refund warranty, if the refund
is accompanied by a promise that the customer can purchase a new machine
of higher quality. In commercial markets as contrasted to consumer markets,
it would be more difficult for buyers experiencing product failure to engage in
arbitrage. If the sales representative has personalknowledge of the operation
of the buyer's business, he or she would be able to identify customers making
60
purchases for resale.
60. The discussion of warranties as a means of achieving discrimination can be extended to
cover the insurance aspect of a warranty as well as the selection of product quality. If consumers
learn about their type through experience with the product, then an adverse selection insurance
problem is created. In a money-refund scheme, there are buyers who have no product experience,
and others who have experienced failure. The latter have a higher probability of being a bad type.

Page 107: Winter 1989]

B.

BREACH OF WARRANTY

Replacement Warranties and Cost-Reducing Investment by the Seller

A money refund is advantageous primarily because it gives buyers the
freedom to switch from one product to another. A major disadvantage is that
buyers may be forced to switch to another product. There are several reasons
that buyers may prefer to deal with the same seller even after product failure.
For example, they may learn that a particular seller's product satisfies their
needs. Alternatively, they may find it costly to go through the bidding and
contracting process with other firms, or to spend the greater time required to
deal with other firms. Money-refund and replacement remedies differ in their
ability to induce the seller to make investments in producing low cost
replacements, and in actually providing replacements. Because replacement
policies achieve greater efficiency with respect to these activities, they are
commonly observed.
As illustrated in the model below, the virtue of the replacement remedy,
relative to a refund remedy, is its ability to stimulate a greater level of
investment in some process or equipment that reduces the cost of providing
replacement products. The investment could be transaction-specific, such as
an investment in human or physical capital particularly suited to producing
replacement products for a given buyer. Alternatively, the investment may be
one of general value to the seller, such as the implementation of product
service management or inventory control. To simplify the following
discussion, only inventory investment will be considered.
With a money refund, the buyer may purchase another unit from the
original seller provided that there are sufficient units in stock to satisfy the
buyer's needs. On the other hand, if insufficient inventory is maintained, then
the buyer must go elsewhere. Of course, the same is true for the replacement
contract; if there are no products in stock, buyers will not get a timely
replacement and may have to go elsewhere. However, with a replacement
warranty, the buyer may demand damages for failure to replace, affecting the
probability that the firm will invest in inventory. To see how this may occur,
we will consider the following model.
Suppose there is one buyer who is interested in maximizing expected
profit by purchasing one unit of product, good 1, worth V in the event that it
works, and nothing if it fails. Denote the probability of failure byf. Suppose
Ideally, a different mix of warranty coverage and product price should be provided to these different
types of consumers, resulting in both types being fully insured. It is well known to economists that,
in general, efficient insurance cannot be achieved in this situation, because the seller cannot identify
and separate the good risks from the bad.
In this setting, the replacement warranty provides a natural method of overcoming the adverse
selection problem. There is never more than one type of consumer in the market, those with no
product experience. The consumers suffering product failure receive a replacement, and if that
replacement fails, they receive another replacement. The amount of insurance provided through the
warranty is fixed before the consumers learn about their type, hence the adverse selection problem
disappears. While not as forceful, this argument still applies when consumers have some information
about their type before they make their first purchase. The adverse selection problem gets worse as
consumers become better informed through experience with the product, and replacement
warranties diminish this effect.
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further that there is a second type of product available, good 2, subject to the
same probability of failure,f, but which is ill-suited to the buyer's needs and
provides no value regardless of whether or not it works. 6 1 The goods are
experience goods, meaning that inspection of the product by the buyer will
not reveal whether it is type 1 or 2; only through use can the suitability of the
product be determined. 6 2 Assume that the buyer finds a good match by
obtaining good 1, and a bad match by obtaining good 2. Before purchase the
buyer knows that goods 1 and 2 are equally common.
The model is a four-period game populated by N sellers 63 who can furnish
the good at a cost of c. If the product fails, the buyer may obtain a
replacement from the original seller, or purchase one unit from any of the
sellers. For expositional ease an extreme assumption is maintained, that the
original seller can only produce a unit in the third period if an inventory
investment of I is made. This assumption captures a crucial element of the
model, namely, the possibility for the original seller to make an investment
that reduces the cost of providing a replacement. 64
The sequence of actions in this model is depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE

1

Period 1
All sellers make simultaneous offers of price and warranty terms. The buyer accepts
one of the offers and purchases one unit.
Period 2
The successful seller in Period 1 decides whether to make an inventory investment.
Period 3
The buyer consumes the good. Both the buyer and the seller observe whether failure
occurs. The buyer learns privately the quality of the product match. Given product
failure the original seller decides whether to honor the remedy provision of the
warranty policy. The buyer and seller may negotiate a settlement. They may also go
to court in which case the seller loses and pays damages D.
Period 4
If the buyer got a replacement in Period 3 he or she consumes that product.
Otherwise, the sellers make simultaneous price offers, and the buyer purchases a
second unit.

In the first period of this game the sellers make a simultaneous choice of price
and warranty remedies. A seller may offer a contract with no warranty, a free
replacement, or a refund of the purchase price. The buyer selects one unit
61. This assumption is not crucial. The value of a bad match could be positive and less than V.
62. Assume that the seller cannot determine the quality of the match at any time.
63. Let N represent an odd number, and assume that after making the initial purchase, the buyer
faces N - 1 sellers besides the initial firm, half of whom sell a good match, and half of whom sell a
bad match. The same effect could be achieved by assuming that there is a continuum of sellers and
that the production of each type of seller represents one-half of the density of the products
manufactured by all sellers.
64. In this case, the seller can reduce the cost of replacement from o0 to c by investing I, where c
can be interpreted as the cost of finishing an unfinished good in inventory.
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from the firm offering the contract that maximizes the buyer's expected profit,
and chooses randomly in the case of a tie. In the second period, the
successful seller decides whether to invest a constant amount I in inventory.
In the third period, the buyer consumes the good purchased in the first period
and discovers the suitability of the match, and whether the product works.
Given product failure in the second period, the original seller decides in the
third period whether to honor the warranty agreement, or breach and pay
damages D. In the final period, if the product has failed or is a bad match, the
buyer can re-enter the market in which sellers simultaneously set prices;
however, no warranties are offered since the game ends in that period.
To predict equilibrium behavior in this model, the concept of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium will be invoked, but the efficient outcome will be
characterized before coming to this problem. The efficient outcome can be
determined by solving the "social planner's" problem. The "social planner"
is a hypothetical agent who receives all of the information received by the
players, and compels them to take actions that maximize total surplus. This
problem can be subdivided into questions concerning whether, and from
whom, the buyer should purchase, and whether the inventory investment
should be made.
First consider the question of optimal production in the third and fourth
periods. If the state GW (good match and working product) occurs in period
two, then no further production is required. If the state GF (good match and
failure) occurs, then a second unit should be provided by the original seller,
since the expected value of a good from the original seller is (1 - f)V,
compared to 1/2(1 - f)V, if the product is obtained from another seller. Of
course, if the original seller has no inventory, then production must come
from another seller. This repurchase would be worthwhile if 1/2(1 -f)V > c,
which is assumed to hold. After the states BW (bad match and working
product) or BF (bad match and failure) occur, then a unit should be obtained
from a new seller.
Next, consider whether the investment of I is optimal. Expending I is only
beneficial if the state GF arises, which occurs with probability l/2f. Letting [3
be the discount factor, the gain to making the investment is 1/213(1 - f)V,
which is attributable to the certainty of getting a good match. Comparing the
expected gain from investment to the cost yields the comparison 1/413f(1 f)V > I. If this inequality is rectified, then the investment is socially optimal.
Since all firms appear to be identical ex ante, the only question regarding
first period production is whether a unit should be produced. It is easy to
show that the condition assumed above, 1/2(1 -f)V> c, is sufficient to make
first period production optimal. In the following characterization of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, it will be assumed that this condition exists.
Now we turn to analysis of the game played by sellers. The efficiency
conditions derived above will be used to determine whether market behavior
is consistent with efficiency.
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The fourth period of the game is not reached if GW occurs or if GF occurs
and a replacement is provided. If neither of these cases is realized, then
sellers compete in prices for the sale of one unit. The sellers do not know
what state has occurred, but the buyer does. Consider first the game in which
I is invested, so that the original seller can compete. The Nash equilibrium in
prices has the buyer purchasing from the original seller at a price of
c + 1/2(1 -f)V,
if the state was GF, and purchasing from another seller at the price P 2 = c, if
BW or BF occurred. Notice that market power can be exercised by the
original seller in the event that GF is the true state, since the buyer is sure of
getting a good match. If I is not invested, then P 2 + c and the buyer turns to a
new seller in the fourth period.
The third period of the game involves the original seller's decision about
whether to honor the remedy clause of a warranty agreement after GF or
BF. 6 5 If the inventory investment is not made, then a replacement promise
cannot be honored and D is paid by the seller to the buyer, while a moneyrefund agreement will be honored if and only if the first period price P <_ D.
If the investment is made, then a bargaining problem is created as the
parties decide whether to honor the remedy clause of the warranty, to reach
an out of court settlement, or to undertake litigation. We examine a very
simple bargaining process in which the buyer decides whether to make a
warranty claim, and then the seller chooses to honor the warranty or to make
a settlement payment of D to the buyer. In the case of a money-refund
warranty, the seller offers the refund if PI < D, and breaches otherwise.
In the case of a replacement warranty, assume that a replacement has no
salvage value to a consumer experiencing state BF. Suppose the seller adopts
a strategy of always providing replacements. The consumer experiencing BF
will not make a claim on the seller since a replacement would be worthless to
him. Clearly, a GF type consumer will take the replacement if offered, thus
the expected cost of replacement is 1/2c. A strategy of always breaching
results in both types of consumers making claims. The cost of breach is
P2 =

D -

1/4(1 -f)V,

because the seller has a one-half probability of gaining profit 1/2(1 - f)V
from the GF type. Breach is chosen if and only if
D < 1/2c + 1/4(1 -f)V.
The case of a feasible exclusive replacement warranty can be interpreted as a
subcase of this analysis in which D = co, leading to replacement for the GF

consumer.

66

65. Assume that the buyer cannot intentionally break the product and avoid detection so that no
warranty claims occur after BW.
66. Note that this analysis of the bargain gives great bargaining power to the seller, who can now
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The polar opposite bargain involving a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the
buyer yields the following results: When c > D, the seller breaches; when c + (I -f)V > D > C the
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In the second period, the seller, knowing generally what will happen in the
subsequent periods but not knowing what state has been realized, decides
whether to invest. If a money refund warranty has been negotiated,
investment will be undertaken if 1/4 3f(I -f)V > I. This same condition is
applicable when no warranty has been negotiated. This condition, which is
equivalent to the condition in the social planner's problem, arises because the
seller's behavior in the third period is independent of the investment, and the
profit accruing to the seller from making the investment is 1/2 03 (1 - f)V,
and is gained when the state is GF.
Alternatively, given a replacement warranty, the decision to invest
depends on whether D > 1/2c + 1/4(1 -f)V. If D is large enough to satisfy
this condition, then it was shown above that a replacement is always provided
to a GF customer, and nothing is given to a BF customer. The gain from
investment is avoidance of the damage payment 3D, while the cost is
I + 1/213c, so the investment is made if 3f(D - 1/2c) > I. Note that D 1/2c > 1/4(1 - f) V, hence, for values of I between O3f(D - 1/2c)
and 1/413f(1 -f)V, investment will be made under the replacement warranty,
even though it should not be made by an efficiency perspective. The extra
incentive to make the inventory investment occurs because it allows the seller
to avoid the large damage payment. In particular, if D is very large, the effect
is the same as if specific performance were implemented, and the seller
disregards the possibility of state BF, in order to avoid D.
Smaller values of D, such that D < 1/2c + 1/4(1 -f)V, result in breach
by the seller in Period 3, even if the investment is made. Since the damage
payment is made whether or not investment is undertaken, the gain from
investment is 1/213(1 -f)V, the profit accruing from a sale to a good match,
which occurs with probability 1/2f, and the cost is I. Thus, the condition for
investment matches the efficient criterion.
All that remains to characterize the equilibrium of this model is to
determine the first period price and warranty policy. Crucial properties of
Nash equilibrium in prices and warranties are that an efficient warranty policy
is chosen, and that the price is equal to average cost-a result akin to perfect
competition. Provided D is sufficiently small, either choice of remedy or no
remedy at all would be efficient. P, is set low enough that expected profit is
zero, offsetting the potential profits gained from a sale to a GF buyer in period
four.
Importantly, this model demonstrates that the type of remedy, and the
amount of damages assessed if the contracted remedy is not implemented, do
not affect the level of inventory investment when bargaining is possible. In
fact, when no remedy is provided, efficiency is still achieved, and the only
impact of the remedy is on the distribution of profits. This is the obvious

seller makes a settlement payment of c to the buyer; and when D > c + (1 -f)V, the GF buyer gets a
replacement and the BF consumer gets a settlement payment of c.
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Coasian result, but its validity is limited narrowly to this model which makes a
certain special assumption.
In the discussion above, the model was designed so that the original seller
could obtain the entire benefit from the bargain with the GF type buyer in
period four; arguably, this assumption is invalid. For example, if buyers have
downward sloping demand curves, or if the GF buyers have differing
valuations for the product, and perfect price discrimination is impossible,
then the seller will get less than the full benefit of the bargain. If the seller
captures less than the full value of the inventory investment, then his or her
incentive to make the investment is less than the incentive of the social
planner. The implication is that for values of I less than, but close to,
1/413f(1 -f)V,
efficient investment will not be undertaken.
The only remedy that maintains an efficient level of investment when the
seller does not capture the full value of the investment is a replacement
remedy with D = D* = 1/2c + 1/4(1 -f)V. To understand why, notice that
DfD* corresponds to the expected d social value of the inventory investment
plus the expected cost of replacement. If the seller makes the inventory
investment and provides the replacement when necessary, the expected cost is
I + 1/213fc. When faced with D = D*, an investment is made if and only if
I < Df(D* - 1/2c). This is identical to the condition for efficient inventory
investment.
For D < D* the damage award is too small to deter a seller from breaching
the promise to replace a defective product. The economic incentive to invest
in inventory is the same as in the money-refund case. Either remedy may
result in too little investment since the seller captures less than the full value
of the replacement. For D > D*, the replacement remedy produces too much
investment, because the seller is overly concerned about avoiding the damage
payment.
Up to this point the process determining D has been unspecified.
Efficiency results if D* is selected by the parties in a liquidated damage clause
to be implemented if a replacement is not forthcoming. Alternatively, one
might suspect that D* would be implemented at common law by dint of
evolutionary pressures toward efficient common law damage rules.
To investigate the validity of this hypothesis, we will construct values of D
for two different damage rules applied to breach of warranty. If the court
simply provides restitution, then D = P1 / 3, where P = c + 1/2f C. This
value may be larger or smaller than D*, and the implications for efficiency are
unclear. To find the expectation damages, compare the profit to the GF type
buyer when a replacement is provided, 1/2(1 - f)V, to the profits after
breach, 1/2(1 -f)V - c + D, and do the same for the BF type buyer. This
comparison yields 1/2(1 -f)V - c, and 1/2(1 -f)V - c + D, respectively.
Assuming that the court can distinguish the states W from F, but not the states
G from B, then the court will choose D = D* to equate the expected profit to
the buyer who experienced failure and who was denied a replacement, to the
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expected profit of the buyer who received replacement. Thus, a very
satisfying result has emerged: Expectation damages coupled with a
replacement warranty assure an efficient level of investment.
C.

Replacement Warranties and Transaction-Specific Investment
by the Buyer

Besides providing an opportunity for discrimination and encouraging
optimal investment by the seller, replacement warranties offer protection to
the buyer against opportunistic behavior by the seller. The buyer becomes
vulnerable to opportunism if he or she makes an idiosyncratic investment
valuable only when consumed in tandem with a particular product. The
possibility of product failure creates the peril.
Product-specific investments are undertaken to increase the value of a
particular transaction. Reorganizing a production process to accommodate
new equipment, training to use a particular firm's product, and purchasing
inputs or complementary products that can only be used with a particular
firm's product are all examples of transaction-specific investments by the
buyer. Since these investments have little or no value outside of the
relationship with a certain seller, the level of investment will be sensitive to
the warranty remedy chosen.
In the case of a refund remedy, the buyer experiencing failure will be
predisposed to repurchase from the original seller because the investment
creates an implicit switching cost. When prices of all products are equal, the
original seller is more attractive to the buyer because the investment makes
that product more valuable. In this sense a switching cost arises.
A competing product could be enhanced through similar investment, but
at the additional cost of redundant expenditure. The original seller can
exploit this market power by offering a refund warranty and then raising the
price to the repurchaser. The consequence is that foresighted, first-time
buyers will reduce their transaction-specific investment because the potential
gains from the investment are reduced by opportunistic behavior after
product failure. Given a replacement warranty, the seller effectively commits
to a price of zero after product failure, eliminating the possibility of exploiting
the buyer's switching cost 6 7 and guaranteeing the buyer the full benefit of the
investment.
The argument that replacement warranties offer protection to buyers
making idiosyncratic investments illustrates why the replacement remedy
might predominate the refund remedy in the marketplace. But such a
conclusion is premature. The refund remedy has the offsetting virtue of
maintaining flexibility for the buyer who wants to change sellers after product
67. For a general discussion of the impact of switching costs in a market with differentiated
products, see Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 138
(1987).
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failure. Determining which remedy is superior requires a joint analysis of
idiosyncratic investment and preference changes.
Whether the level of investment is more efficient under the replacement or
refund warranty depends on the likelihood that the buyer will want to switch
products as a result of a bad match with the original product. If all the
products in a market are homogeneous, so that there would be no reason to
switch, then the replacement warranty will be more efficient. It becomes less
efficient relative to the refund warranty as products become more
differentiated, and as buyers become less certain of the attributes of products.
68
These claims are substantiated in a model developed by the authors,
illustrated in Figure 2, which consists of a Hotelling duopoly market with a
single buyer located somewhere between the sellers who are found on the
endpoints of the unit interval.
FIGURE

2

HOTELLING MODEL

effective price of A

effective price of B

P,

P4

A

I
0.2

I

I

0,

0..1

B

The buyer knows his or her preference for the products (represented by a
position on the line), but the sellers are uncertain about the buyer's
preference. The buyer chooses to purchase from the producer offering the
lowest effective price, which is the sum of the actual price and the
dissatisfaction cost. The dissatisfaction cost is incurred by the buyer from
consuming a product that differs from the ideal product corresponding to the
buyer's position on the line, and it increases as the distance between a seller
and the buyer increase. The effective prices of the two products are shown in
Figure 2. A buyer located to the left of 01, where the effective cost lines
68. K. Chapman & M. Meurer, Warranties, Switching Costs and Transaction
Investments by Consumers (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
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intersect, purchases from producer A, and one located to the right of 0
purchases from B.
This structure is enriched to permit the study of warranty remedies by
introducing a probabilityf of product failure. After purchasing the product,
but before it has been determined whether the product is functional, the
buyer makes an investment that raises the value of the product. If the buyer
gets a working product in the first period, he or she exits the market.
Otherwise, the buyer re-enters the market in the second period. In addition,
the buyer's preferences change between periods, 6 9 possibly making a switch
to the other product attractive.
In the case of a money refund, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
analyzed for the game having the following stages: (1) sellers simultaneously
choose first period prices; (2) the buyer chooses one unit from either A or B,
and chooses a reliance investment; (3) the sellers simultaneously choose
second period prices, if the product failed in the first period; and (4) the buyer
chooses one unit from either A or B.
Four variables must be chosen optimally to achieve efficiency in this
environment: the level of investment, and 01, 024, and 028, which are the
market boundaries in the first period, the second period after a purchase of A
in the first period, and the second period after a purchase of B in the first
period, respectively. Because of the symmetry of the model 01 * = 1*/2, that
is, the buyer purchases from the closest seller in the first period, minimizing
dissatisfaction cost. The level of investment is chosen such that the expected
marginal benefit equals marginal cost of investment. The optimal market
boundaries in the second period are not at 1/2, since the reliance investment
creates a switching cost. Given a purchase of A in the first period, 02 is
greater than 1/2, and similarly, 02B is less than 1/2. The interpretation of this
result is straightforward; given a reliance investment in A, even though the
buyer's preference may have changed favorably toward B so that the
consumer is located at a point greater than 1/2, A might still be purchased
because it is more valuable.
In the equilibrium in which both sellers use a money refund, the value of
01 is 1/2, but 021 is too small relative to the optimal value, and 02B is too large;
furthermore, the reliance investment is always too low. The reliance
investment is too low because the buyer is more vulnerable to the exercise of
market power by the original seller as the value of the reliance investment
rises. A consequence of the reduced investment is lower switching costs,
moving the market boundaries in the second period closer to 1/2.
If replacement warranties are used instead, 01 is again equal to 1/2. 02
and 02B are no longer relevant because the buyer gets a replacement product.
The reliance investment may be greater or smaller than the optimal
investment, but will be closer to the optimum than the investment in the case
69. This change in preferences would most naturally result from new information received by
the buyer regarding the nature of the products.
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of the refund warranty. The replacement remedy provides better incentives
for reliance investment, because the buyer, rather than the seller, captures the
benefit of the investment in the second period. The replacement remedy is
less desirable because it eliminates the buyer's flexibility with respect to
second period purchases.
The efficiency of the warranty policy can be improved if a broader
conception of remedies is embraced. For example, the refund of the purchase
price could be supplemented by recovery of the cost of investment through a
liquidated damages clause, or as consequential damages. These measures
could introduce overcorrection in the form of excessive investment, but that
problem could be forestalled by contract terms specifying a permissible level
of investment.
The possibility of implementing these more sophisticated remedies
depends on what information is verifiable by the courts. A contract provision
governing acceptable reliance investment might be difficult to construct and
apply. A related problem is that the courts must be able to detect buyer
misuse of the product designed to gain recovery for investments that are
worth less than the damages.
In the previous section the replacement warranty coupled with expectation
damages for breach motivated the seller to invest in inventory to avoid
damage- payments. In this section the replacement warranty protects the
buyer who makes an investment raising the value of a particular seller's
product from exploitation by the seller. The replacement warranty does not
fare as well if the seller makes a product-specific investment that raises the
value of the product to the buyer.
Given a replacement warranty, the seller has no incentive to make an
investment that raises the value of the product to the customer, since the
seller does not share in gains. With a refund remedy the seller can extract
part or all of the value of the investment in the subsequent sale. The
performance of the replacement warranty can be ameliorated by
renegotiation. The contract could be modified to provide for product
improvements in the replacement in return for additional payment from the
buyer.
V
CONCLUSION

After noting the prevalence of repair-or-replacement terms as remedies in
warranty policies, we examined the economics literature for an explanation of
their predominance over money damage remedies. The comparative
advantage theory is persuasive in justifying a preference for repair provisions,
but not for replacement provisions. The literature does not explain
satisfactorily why repair is coupled with replacement rather than refund in
most warranties.
One explanation that deserves serious consideration is that the apparent
exclusivity of the replacement remedy is illusory because the law does not
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make a commitment to replace a failed product credible, since a seller can
breach that promise and pay damages. Further reflection on this possibility
makes it clear that the market can make credible what the law does not. Firms
do not routinely breach their promise to provide replacements because such
action would tarnish their reputation and produce settlement or litigation
costs.
This article advances three new theories on the economic role of
warranties that generate different effects for replacement and refund
warranties. The first holds that a claim of product failure can be used by the
seller to sort customers into two classes, permitting discrimination between
those classes. A replacement remedy is superior to a refund remedy for
sorting purposes because it provides greater protection against arbitrage by
the favored customers. The second theory focuses on investments by the
seller that make the cost of replacement lower, such as investments in
inventory or product service management. It shows that a refund remedy
does not permit the seller to capture the entire benefit of these investments
and leads to an inefficiently low level of investment. The replacement
warranty, however, coupled with expectation damages if the replacement
promise is breached, does achieve efficiency. Finally, this article develops a
theory holding that warranties protect the transaction-specific investment of
the buyer. The key observation in this model is that an investment by the
buyer that raises the value of the original seller's product creates a cost with
respect to switching to an alternative product upon failure of the original. If a
refund is provided to a buyer after product failure, and the buyer wants to
repurchase from the original seller, the switching cost allows the seller to
appropriate much of the value of the buyer's investment, diminishing the
incentive for the investment. The replacement remedy overcomes this
problem by fixing the cost of repurchase at zero and eliminating the seller's
market power.

